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Abstract 
The recent global financial crisis has had a diverse effect on countries’ fiscal stance, 
especially throughout the EU. This paper examines the impact of macroeconomic shocks, 
including those to government revenues and expenditures, on EU countries’ fiscal stance, on 
aggregate, and within the EU’s sub-regions as defined by the length of countries’ membership 
in the EU and their level of indebtedness. The fiscal stance is measured by means of the 
government deficit, and the impact of macroeconomic shocks is examined using impulse 
responses from a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model estimated on annual panel 
data. The analyzed system of macroeconomic variables includes, government revenues and 
expenditures, GDP growth, CPI inflation, the interest rate, the terms of trade, and the real 
effective exchange rate. The paper discusses the policy implications and the challenges for the 
EU and its sub-regions concerning the fiscal policy setting and balanced fiscal stance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial and economic crisis revealed important fiscal vulnerabilities as 
governments responded with various policy measures including increased government spending to 
resurrect their despaired economies. The vulnerabilities that materialized in developed economies 
were the result of accumulated risk exposures by the governments over the medium term, and 
triggered by macroeconomic and financial shocks. In this respect the fiscal stance of the Euro Area 
and EU countries was one of the most affected. However, the initial exposures and shocks that 
uncovered the accumulated vulnerabilities and made them take shape varied importantly across the 
EU. This variation provides a useful sample to study the impact of macroeconomic shocks on fiscal 
stance including due to the EU countries’ harmonized institutional and legal environments.  
This paper thus investigates the impacts of basic macroeconomic and financial shocks on the 
fiscal stance in the EU, including by looking into the differences between those impacts across the 
eurozone and new EU member countries. The macroeconomic shocks of interest include the demand 
(GDP) and supply (CPI inflation) shocks and the financial shock as approximated by the interest rate 
shock. In addition, discretionary changes in government expenditures and revenues are considered. 
For this purpose, the paper estimates a structural VAR model encompassing basic macroeconomic, 
financial and fiscal variables with the use of a pooled panel regression approach. The estimated pooled 
SVAR model is then used to derive impulse response functions (IRFs) and study the dynamics of the 
variables of interest to shocks identified by the model based on the EU countries’ data.   
We find that the fiscal stance (deficits) of Euro Area (EA12) could be relatively more 
vulnerable to government expenditure and revenue shocks compared to new EU Member States 
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(EU12). 1
Our paper fits into the literature analyzing the character (cyclicality) and effects of fiscal 
policy in the EA and EU. Recently, probably due to the impact of the financial and economic crisis, 
the role of public budgets has been intensively analyzed in both academic and policy-oriented 
literature. In addition, since the role of fiscal policy in the monetary union is crucial, a significant bulk 
of recent research efforts was oriented towards the EA and EU. The influential contributions by Fatas 
and Mihov (2003) and Gali and Perotti (2003) seem to be the cornerstones of the contemporary 
analysis of fiscal policy. In line with our results, Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011), depict fiscal deficits 
to be an important potential source of idiosyncratic macroeconomic fluctuations in Europe. They 
conclude that individual fiscal policies, reflecting rather national priorities, may become a potential 
source of asymmetric shocks with likely harmful effects in the performance of monetary policy in a 
monetary union. Using an estimated DSGE model for the EA to study the effects of fiscal stabilization 
policies, Ratto et al. (2006) analyze the effects of fiscal stabilization via government consumption, 
investment, transfers and wage taxes. They find empirical evidence for systematic countercyclical 
fiscal policy in the EA. In addition, they find fiscal policy to be effective in stabilizing GDP in the 
presence of demand and supply shocks. Estimating separate fiscal policy reaction functions in good 
and bad times, Turrini (2008) analyzes the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in the EA countries over 
the period 1980-2005. He concludes that the average stance of fiscal policy is expansionary when 
output is above potential, thus denoting a pro-cyclical bias in good times, although no strong evidence 
of a cyclical bias is found in bad times which supports our evidence on the character of fiscal policy in 
the EU.  
  On the other hand, the fiscal stance in EU12 shows vulnerability to a GDP (demand) shock 
because the increase in revenues after positive GDP shock is often outpaced by greater expenditure 
increases in EU12. The estimated vulnerabilities appear to stem from a disproportionate policy 
response, mostly on the government expenditure side and a lacking discipline to diminish pro-cyclical 
fiscal spending. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the applied model 
and estimation methodology. Section three describes the data and the data sources. Section four 
discusses the estimation results. And, section five concludes. 
 
2. Model and Estimation Methodology 
 
We use a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model to estimate the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on fiscal variables and other main macroeconomic fundamentals within the 
EU (see also Melecky and Raddatz, 2011). The PVAR relates the macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
of interest to their lagged values and can be written as: 
0 , ,
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where , , , , , , ,,( , ,, ) ,,i t i ti t i t i t i t i tINF R REx TT EXP GD VP ′=  ,i tx  is the vector of endogenous variables 
including the percentage change in the terms-of-trade index, the (log of) real government expenditures 
(EXP ), GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars (GDP), the inflation rate ( INF ), nominal interest 
rate (R ), and government revenues (REV ). The main focus of the paper is on EXP , GDP  and 
REV , but we include inflation and interest rates in the vector of endogenous variables as controls for 
other macroeconomic conditions. This set includes all the conventional macroeconomic variables 
typically included in macro models (see Monacelli (2005), Linde et al (2008), and Adolfson (2001), 
among others). The parameters iθ  and tθ  are country and year fixed-effects that capture long run 
differences in all the variables across countries, and the impact of global factors that are common to all 
countries in the sample and can be understood as the world business cycle. The coefficient i  captures 
                                                 
1 The EA12 countries include Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. EU12 countries include Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
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a country-specific trend. The residual term  ,i tε  corresponds to an error term that is assumed to be i.i.d 
~ (0, σ ).  
The number of lags, q , is assumed to be equal to one due to the small number of observation 
for some new EU member state especially Bulgaria and Romania. Nevertheless, even after eliminating 
these two countries the conventional lag length selection criteria (Akaike and Schwartz information 
criteria) point to the optimal selection of one lag for the VAR at hand.  The model parameters are 
contained in matrices jA , and the structural interpretation of the results depends on the identification 
of the parameters of the contemporaneous matrix 0A . Although we are interested in analyzing the 
impulse response function for the government deficit, we do not include it explicitly as a variable into 
the model. The model includes logs of expenditure and revenues, which are by definition always 
positive. The logged government deficit is constructed based on the dynamics of the two variables and 
their steady state (average) shares in the deficit in the studied countries. 
The main identification assumption imposes a diagonal structure on the 0A  matrix. This 
implies that the terms of trade respond to other macroeconomic variables only with a lag. Further, 
output, inflation, interest rates and revenues respond contemporaneously to changes in expenditures, 
but government expenditures respond to changes in a country’s economic conditions and fiscal 
revenues only after a year.  Similarly, revenues are assumed to respond contemporaneously to changes 
in expenditures, GDP, inflation, and interest rates, but these variables respond to shocks to revenues 
only with a one year lag. The assumptions on the ordering of the fiscal variables relative to GDP are 
similar to those in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki et al. (2010). The ordering of inflation 
and interest rates relative to output also follow the standard ordering in the monetary policy literature 
(Christiano et al., 1998). The identification assumptions translate into the following matrix of 
contemporaneous relations ( 0A ), 
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The model described in equation (1) corresponds to a PVAR, because we assume that the 
dynamics, represented by the different parameters and matrices, are common across the different 
cross-sectional units (countries) included in the estimation, which are indexed by i . This is a standard 
assumption in this literature (see Broda (2004); Uribe and Yue (2006)). We estimate the parameters of 
equation (1) for the cases where the series are trend stationary in levels. The residuals are stationary 
and overall well behaved given the structure of the model. 
The model parameters are estimated by SURE and used to recover the impulse-response 
functions (IRF) of the endogenous variables in equation (1) to the structural shocks using the variance-
covariance matrices of reduced form errors derived from these coefficients.2
 
 The confidence bands for 
the IRF come from parametric bootstrapping on the model assuming normally distributed reduced 
form errors. 
                                                 
2 The use of SURE is standard for the estimation of the reduced form equation. It is equivalent to estimating the 
model equation by equation by OLS, but is more efficient because it takes into account contemporaneous 
correlations among variables. It also directly estimates the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form residuals. 
We use only the two-step version of the estimator for reasons of speed, but when iterated until convergence the 
SURE estimators are equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimators.     
4 
 
3. Data Description 
 
The data series for all EU countries were obtained from the AMECO database, except for the 
interest rate series which was taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistic and for Bulgaria 
and Romania supplemented by authors calculation based on national and IMF country desk 
information before 2000. The detailed data sources are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Employed Data Series and Their Sources 
Variable Source Notes 
Terms of Trade Terms of trade goods and services  year 2000=100 
Government Expenditures Total expenditure: general government Mrd EUR; ESA 1995 
Government Revenue Total revenue: general government Mrd ECU/EUR; ESA 1995 
Nominal GDP Gross domestic product at current market prices Mrd ECU/EUR 
GDP Deflator Price deflator gross domestic product at market prices year 2000 = 100 
CPI Harmonised consumer price index (All-items) year 2005 = 100 
Interest Rate long term real interest rate >5 years, various sources 
Eurostat, IMF IFS, Haver 
Analytics, Bloomberg, 
ECB, OECD 
Source: AMECO, IMF IFS, and authors computation 
 
The real GDP is constructed from the nominal GDP and the GDP deflator. The long-term real 
interest rate is obtain for most countries from the Eurostat except for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and 
Estonia for which it is taken from IMF IFS; Romania and Slovenia for which it is taken from the ECB 
database; and Slovakia for which it is taken from the OECD database. For the purpose of the 
regression estimation all variables are in logs. Table 2 in the Appendix provides data summary 
statistics for the employed data series in the panel structure. 
 
4. Discussion of Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 reports the VAR reduced-form estimates. All variables show significant positive 
autocorrelation, with the GDP one being the highest (0.879), and the interest rate one (0.310) the 
lowest. In accord with the identification assumption, the terms of trade dynamics, in column one, is 
not influenced by other domestic variables. Government expenditures are, in addition to their lagged 
value, significantly influenced by lagged GDP and the interest rate in a positive way. In contrast, 
lagged government expenditures have a negative effect on GDP. CPI inflation seems to also depend 
only on its lagged value similarly as the terms of trade. The interest rate is, in addition to its lagged 
value, influenced positively by the terms of trade. Finally, government revenues are influenced by 
their lagged value and GDP in a positive manner, and negatively by government expenditures. These 
estimates predetermine the direction and shape of the impulse response functions (IRFs) that we 
discuss next. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Reduced-Form VAR for the EU 
 TTpwt gexppckd gdppckd dcpi irate grevpckd 
TTpwt(-1) 
0.468 -0.045 -0.005 0.025 4.751 -0.001 
(0.045)*** (0.152) (0.117) (0.040) (1.144)*** (0.139) 
gexppckd(-1) 
0.000 0.360 -0.229 -0.032 0.585 -0.182 
(0.000) (0.074)*** (0.055)*** (0.020) (0.540) (0.067)*** 
gdppckd(-1) 
-0.000 0.231 0.879 0.027 0.309 0.395 
(0.000) (0.087)*** (0.065)*** (0.023) (0.639) (0.079)*** 
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dcpi(-1) 
0.000 -0.039 -0.180 0.329 -1.023 -0.027 
(0.000) (0.154) (0.115) (0.041)*** (1.130) (0.139) 
irate(-1) 
-0.000 0.016 0.001 -0.001 0.310 0.006 
(0.000) (0.008)** (0.006) (0.002) (0.057)*** (0.007) 
grevpckd(-1) 
0.000 0.084 0.003 0.029 -0.446 0.456 
(0.000) (0.090) (0.067) (0.024) (0.664) (0.082)*** 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; we do not report the coefficient 
estimates for cross-section and time-series dummy variables and the constant for brevity.  
 
 
4.1 The EU Estimation Results 
  
Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the government deficit, 
government expenditure and government revenue to shocks that the model identified from data based 
on its structure and coefficient estimates. The mean IRFs are depicted by a solid line and their 
corresponding one-standard-deviation confidence intervals by dashed lines. We do not report the IRFs 
for the remaining endogenous variables for the sake of brevity, but these estimates are available from 
the authors.  
 
Figure 1: Cumulative Impulse Responses based SVAR Estimated for the EU 
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Consider the first column of Figure one which shows the IRFs of the government deficit to the 
terms of trade shock, the government expenditure shock (the discretionary changes in government 
expenditure), the GDP (demand) shock, the CPI inflation (supply shocks), the interest rate (monetary 
policy) shock, and the government revenue shock (the discretionary changes in government revenue), 
respectively. We find that government deficit of the EU countries responds significantly to shocks in 
government expenditure and interest rate shocks which force the deficit to increase by about 20 and 
five percent respectively. In contrast, significant negative IRFs are estimated when the EU economies 
are hit by a positive GDP shock or government revenue shock. The increase in interest rates (debt 
service charges) or government expenditure are expected to increase government deficit, and also the 
lowering of deficits after positive GDP and government revenue shocks is intuitive and could be 
labeled as an equilibrating policy response. 
Next consider the second column of Figure 1 which describes the IRFs for government 
expenditure. The estimates suggest that government expenditures respond significantly to the terms of 
trade shock, the government expenditure shock, the GDP shock and the interest rate shock in a 
positive way. However, the cumulative response to the interest rate becomes insignificant after five 
years. We will discuss these IRFs in conjunction with the IRFs for the government revenues reported 
in the last column of Figure 1. 
Government revenues in the EU increase significantly in response to the terms of trade, 
government expenditure, GDP and government revenue shocks, while they decrease significantly in 
response to the CPI inflation (negative supply) shock. One can observe in the first row of Figure 1 that 
the positive response of government expenditure and revenues after the terms of trade shock is of a 
similar magnitude and therefore the effect of the shock on the deficit is insignificant. Although the 
discretionary increase in government expenditures seems to be to some extent financed by rising 
government revenues, EU countries still get into significant deficit positions because the increase in 
their expenditures is about two times bigger than the revenue increase. The positive GDP (demand) 
shock increases government revenues in EU countries more than the countries raise their expenditures 
as a result of higher income. This ensures that the positive GDP shock lowers government deficits in 
EU countries. Even though government revenues decline significantly after an inflation (supply) 
shock, also government expenditures decline somewhat resulting in an insignificant change in the 
government deficit. After positive interest rate shock, government revenues tend to decline with about 
five year lag but rather insignificantly. Nevertheless, in combination with the estimated significant 
increase in government expenditure, as a result of the increased debt servicing cost, the estimated 
impact of the interest rate shock on the deficit is significantly positive. Finally, the discretionary 
increase in government revenues impact positively on government revenues, as expected, while EU 
countries manage to contain their expenditures and secure lowering of government deficits.  
Due to the on-going debate on the fiscal discipline in the context of the recent fiscal crisis in 
the eurozone and some other EU countries, we will dissect the fiscal responses to the considered 
shocks for the old and new EU members next. 
 
 
4.2 Comparing the Pools of Old and New EU Members 
  
Figure 2 shows the comparison of IRFs of government deficit, expenditure and revenue to the 
structural shocks identified by the estimated SVARs for EA12 and EU12 countries.  The impulse 
responses for EA12 are depicted by the solid lines with their one-standard-deviation confidence 
intervals described by the respective dashed lines. The IRFs for EU12 are then described by the circle 
lines where again the solid circle line depicts the mean response and the dashed circle lines show the 
associated confidence intervals. A significant difference in IRFs occurs when the IRFs and their 
confidence intervals for EA12 and EU12 countries do not overlap. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of Cumulative IRFs for the Old and New EU Member Groups 
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Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
Consider for instance the first column of Figure 2 which describes the impact of the terms of 
trade shock on the fiscal variables of interest. Since in the second and third panel the bands delineated 
by the IRF confidence intervals overlap we can concur that there is no significant difference between 
the EA12 and EU12 in the responses of government expenditures and revenues to terms of trade 
shocks. However, there appear to be a significant difference in the response of deficits to the term of 
trade shock across the EA12 and EU12. While for the EU12 both the response of government 
expenditures and revenues to terms of trade shock is not different from zero, for the EA12 the 
response of revenues is significantly positive. As a result, after a positive terms of trade shock, the 
EA12 countries on average reduce their deficits, while the EU12 countries’ deficits remain unaltered.   
From now on we will discuss only the IRFs in Figure 2 for which we find significant differences 
between the EA12 and EU12.  
Consider the second column of Figure 2, namely the last panel in that column, which shows 
significantly higher response of government revenues in EU12 than in EA12 after a discretionary 
increase in government expenditure (shock). Consequently the first panel of that column shows greater 
increase in government deficit in response to the government expenditure shock. This can lead to a 
conjecture that discretionary increases in government expenditure are financed to a significant extent 
by increases in government revenues in EU12 countries whereas in EA12 countries they are financed 
by new borrowings (debt). This could make the EA12 countries’ fiscal stance more vulnerable to 
government expenditure shocks. 
The IRFs in the third column suggest that a positive GDP shock increases revenues more 
prominently in EU12 than in EA12 (last panel). However EU12 tends to raise their government 
expenditures in view of increasing income while EA12 uses the increased revenues to significantly 
decrease their fiscal deficits and improve the fiscal stance. This results in a significantly different 
dynamics of fiscal deficits in the EA12 and EU12 after a positive GDP shock which makes the EU12 
more vulnerable, especially in the medium term. 
Consider now the fourth column which, in the last panel, shows that the responses of 
government revenue to an inflation (supply) shock differ significantly across the EA12 and EU12. 
Namely, for the EA12 as prices increase so does the revenues as presumably the tax base increases. On 
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the other hand, in the EU12, once a price shock occurs a negative supply shock seems to unfold that 
lowers the economy’s income, the tax base and government revenues. Despite these contrasting 
differences in the reaction of revenues, the fiscal deficit does not respond significantly to the shock in 
either of the two blocks. This is mainly due to a counterbalancing decrease in government 
expenditures in EU12, and a great uncertainty about the response of government expenditures in 
EA12.  
Since there are no significant differences detected by our estimates in regards to the response 
of the fiscal variables to an interest rate shock, we proceed with discussing the impact of the 
government revenue shock. These impacts are described in column six. The corresponding IRFs 
suggest that after a discretionary increase in (one-standard deviation shock to) government revenues 
the EA12 increases their government expenditure while EU12 tends to decrease their government 
expenditures. This results in significantly greater reduction of government deficits in EU12 than in 
EA12. However, for the latter this positive shock appears to be neutralized as the medium term 
(cumulative) impact on the fiscal deficit is close to zero. Nevertheless, this indicates vulnerability of 
the fiscal stance in EA12 countries to a positive revenue shock in the short term. 
Overall we thus find based on our estimates that the fiscal stance of EA12 could be relatively 
more vulnerable to government expenditure and revenue shocks compared to EU12. On the other 
hand, the fiscal stance in EU12 could be relatively more vulnerable to a GDP (demand) shock. The 
estimated vulnerabilities could stem from a disproportionate policy response mostly on the 
government expenditure side and a lacking discipline in regards to containing pro-cyclical fiscal 
spending. This could provide an argument for advocating fiscal rules focused on government 
expenditure (IMF, 2009; Kopits, 2004).          
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper studied the impact of aggregate macroeconomic, financial and fiscal shocks on 
fiscal variables, including government revenues, expenditures and deficits of the Euro Area and other 
EU countries. The study was carried out with the use of estimated pooled SVAR model on EU 
countries data. We found that government revenues increase after the terms of trade, government 
expenditure, GDP and government revenue shocks. In contrast they tend to decline after the price 
(negative supply) shock. EU countries get into deficit positions after a discretionary increase in 
government expenditure despite some financing of this increase from additional government revenues. 
This is because the increase in their expenditures is about two times bigger than the additionally raised 
revenue increase. On aggregate, the EU countries are able to raise more revenues after a positive GDP 
(demand) shock while limiting their expenditures. This ensures that the positive GDP shock lowers 
government deficits in the EU. Similarly, a discretionary increase in government revenues tends to be 
accompanied by restrained fiscal expenditures, and this helps lower government deficits. However 
after a positive interest rate shock, the combination of an increase in government expenditure and 
declining revenues in the medium-term makes the deficit grow significantly.  
When comparing the responses of fiscal variables for the Euro Area and the new EU member 
states, we find that the fiscal stance of the Euro Area could be relatively more vulnerable to 
government expenditure and revenue shocks compared to the new EU member states. Concerning the 
Euro Area vulnerability to expenditure shocks, it appears that discretionary increases in government 
expenditure could be financed by new borrowings (debt) as opposed to additional revenue collection 
and this worsens Euro Area countries’ fiscal stance. What concerns the Euro Area vulnerability to 
fiscal revenue shocks, it arises because the EA12 increase their government expenditure after a 
discretionary increase in government revenues.  
On the other hand, the fiscal stance in the new EU member states could be relatively more 
vulnerable to a GDP (demand) shock as the resulting increase in revenues is often outpaced by greater 
expenditure increases in the new EU countries. The estimated vulnerabilities could stem from a 
disproportionate policy response mostly on the government expenditure side and lacking discipline in 
regards to restraining pro-cyclical fiscal spending. This could advocate for fiscal rules to be focused on 
government expenditure rather than other fiscal variables. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Employed Data Series Across Countries   
 Averages  EU Membership 
Country 
GDP       
per      
capita 
Revenues 
to        
GDP 
Expenditures 
to             
GDP 
Deficit     
to               
GDP 
Number        
of       
observations 
EA 
12 
EU 
12 
Austria 14854 0.49 0.52 -0.03 22 •   
Belgium 14516 0.47 0.52 -0.05 20 •   
Bulgaria 2443 0.38 0.39 -0.01 14   • 
Cyprus 8046 0.37 0.40 -0.03 14   • 
Czech Rep 7810 0.40 0.45 -0.05 13   • 
Denmark 18733 0.53 0.53 0.00 22     
Estonia 6689 0.39 0.38 0.01 15   • 
Finland 15155 0.51 0.50 0.02 22 •   
France 14218 0.49 0.52 -0.03 21 •   
Germany 15202 0.44 0.46 -0.02 16 •   
Greece 7832 0.37 0.46 -0.08 17 •   
Hungary 5067 0.44 0.50 -0.05 14   • 
Ireland 13722 0.38 0.42 -0.04 17 •   
Italy 11908 0.43 0.50 -0.07 22 •   
Latvia 4784 0.35 0.37 -0.02 12   • 
Lithuania 4863 0.34 0.38 -0.04 12   • 
Luxembourg 28758 0.42 0.40 0.02 16 •   
Malta 5678 0.38 0.43 -0.05 14   • 
Netherlands 15295 0.48 0.51 -0.03 22 •   
Poland 4246 0.40 0.45 -0.05 14   • 
Portugal 6392 0.35 0.40 -0.05 22 •   
Romania 2742 0.33 0.36 -0.04 8   • 
Slovakia 6704 0.38 0.45 -0.07 16   • 
Slovenia 12070 0.43 0.47 -0.03 11   • 
Spain 9162 0.38 0.41 -0.03 16 •   
Sweden 17710 0.56 0.57 -0.01 18     
UK 13185 0.41 0.45 -0.04 22     
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
